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Recent empirical contributions in labor economics suggest that individual firms face upward 
sloping labor supplies. We rationalize this by assuming that idiosyncratic non-pecuniary 
conditions interact with money wages in workers’ decisions to work for specific firms. 
Likewise, firms supply differentiated goods in response to differences in consumer tastes. 
Hence, firms are price-makers and wage-setters. By combining monopolistic and 
monopsonistic competition, our setting encapsulates general equilibrium interactions 
between the two markets. The equilibrium involves double exploitation of labor. Compared to 
the competitive outcome, the high-productive workers are overpaid under free entry, whereas 
the low-productive workers are underpaid. In the same vein, capital-owners receive a 
premium, whereas workers are exploited. 
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The economics of labor markets has been, and to a large extent is still, dominated by the
competitive paradigm. This means that, by slightly decreasing the wage it pays a ﬁrm would
lose all its workers. Surveying recent empirical contributions that aims to measure the ex-
tent of monopsony power in labor markets, Ashenfelter et al. (2010) conclude that ﬁrms
face labor supplies that are not inﬁnitely elastic. This fact may be rationalized by assuming
that idiosyncratic non-pecuniary conditions strongly interact with the role of money wages
in workers’ decisions to accept oﬀers made by speciﬁc ﬁrms. Empirical work conﬁrms the
idea that the standard assumption of identical ﬁrms glosses over many important aspects
of reality. In particular, ﬁrms’ behavior build on their core competencies and corporate cul-
ture because these ones can hardly be imitated, thus making them inherently heterogeneous
(Berger, 2005). As a consequence, heterogeneous workers view jobs oﬀered by diﬀerent ﬁrms
as bundles of non-wage job attributes which provide them with more or less satisfaction,
very much as heterogeneous consumers perceive diﬀerentiated products as diﬀerent bundles
of non-price product characteristics (Rosen, 2002). This agrees with Hamermesh (1977) who
observes that the gap between actual wages and competitive wages is positively correlated
with various measures of job satisfaction. Likewise, it is well documented in industrial orga-
nization that producers supply diﬀerentiated goods in response to diﬀerences in consumer
tastes. In such a context, ﬁrms are endowed with market power that allow them to be both
price-makers and wage-setters (Manning, 2003). As will be shown in this paper, blending
imperfections on the product and labor markets within a uniﬁed framework yields new and
insightful results about the distribution of earnings, which all agree with empirical evidence.
More precisely, we distinguish two market environments. In the ﬁrst place, when the
number of ﬁrms is exogenous, we show that the equilibrium involves double exploitation
of workers, meaning that workers are paid below their marginal value product for two
distinct reasons. The former stems from the heterogeneity of workers that endows ﬁrms
with monopsony power. Because each worker has a most-preferred employer, ﬁrms may set
a lower wage while attracting their captive labor pool. The latter results from the fact that
ﬁrms are price-makers on the product market because they sell a diﬀerentiated good. In
this case, they evaluate workers’ marginal productivity at the marginal revenue, which is
lower than the market price. Hence, workers’ marginal productivity is undervalued. All in
all, once it is recognized that both the product and labor markets operate under imperfect
competition, the market yields an ineﬃcient outcome that involves an income transfer from
the workers to the ﬁrms. It is worth stressing that labor exploitation is here the involuntary
consequences of a myriad of individual behaviors made by ﬁrms in an environment in which
they behave non-cooperatively and where any single ﬁrm is negligible to the market.
Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium is such that the wage gap exceeds the produc-
tivity gap between any two diﬀerent types of workers. Indeed, a worker’s genuine wage is
equal to her actual wage plus the monetary evaluation of the hedonic attributes of her job.
Since the relative value of the hedonic attributes is lower for the high-wage workers than for
the low-wage workers, the high-wage workers are more sensitive to wage diﬀerences than the
low-wage workers. Hence, the latter are more exploited than the former, which means that
workers’ heterogeneity magniﬁes productivity diﬀerences. Last, even when workers have
the same productivity, wage dispersion may arise because workers need not have the same
1preferences. Firms then exploit workers’ idiosyncrasies to set diﬀerent wages. For instance,
de la Rica et al. (2010) ﬁnd that monopsonistic features, which could be related to women’
lower labor mobility due to housework, explain the gender wage gap in Spain.
I nt h es e c o n dp l a c e ,w h e nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms is endogenous and determined by free
entry and exit, the income transfer from workers to ﬁr m sv a n i s h e sb e c a u s ep r o ﬁts are zero.
This does not mean, however, that workers’ exploitation is washed out by free entry. Labor
exploitation still matters through income transfers across diﬀerent types of workers. More
precisely, the double exploitation gives rise to general equilibrium eﬀects stemming from
the entry of new ﬁrms, which aﬀects the intensity of competition in the product and labor
markets. The above-mentioned magniﬁcation of productivity diﬀerences also holds at free
entry. Since proﬁts are zero, this eﬀect expresses itself through an income transfer from
the low-productive workers to the high-productive workers. More precisely, we show that,
compared to the competitive outcome, the high-productive workers are overpaid, whereas
the low-productive workers are underpaid. This magniﬁcation eﬀect also implies that a tech-
nological shock beneﬁcial to the high-skilled workers exacerbates wage inequality between
high- and low-skilled workers. The heterogeneity of workers’ attitudes toward job oﬀers is
thus likely to be part of the explanation for the growing wage inequality between high- and
low-skilled workers.
In the same vein, workers who value less jobs’ hedonic attributes gain at the expense
of those for whom these attributes are more important, even when they have the same
productivity. Therefore, if a group of workers value more such attributes than another, they
will be discriminated against even if they share identical observable characteristics in every
other aspect. Likewise, if the production factors are capital and labor, we ﬁnd it natural
to suppose that hedonic attributes matter more to workers than to capital-owners. Hence,
capital-owners would receive a premium, whereas workers would be underpaid.
To prove those results, we need a general equilibrium model that accounts for imperfect
competition on both goods’ and labor markets. Although a comprehensive general equilib-
rium model with strategic interactions has so far been out of reach and is likely to remain so
for a long time, it is possible to gain insights from speciﬁc models. To be precise, we model
the product market using the CES model of monopolistic competition of the Dixit-Stiglitz
genre, which permits one to work with imperfect competition and increasing returns on the
product market. As for the labor market, because heterogeneous workers make mutually
exclusive and indivisible job choices, discrete choice theory provides us with an appropriate
tool to model the actual matching value between a worker and a ﬁrm as the realization of a
random variable and, therefore, their heterogeneous response to a wage cut (Anderson et al.,
1992). Speciﬁcally, we assume that workers’ heterogeneity is captured by the logit model.
We acknowledge the fact that our model is very speciﬁc. That said, we want to emphasize
that our modeling strategy has several merits. First, the CES is the workhorse of many
economic ﬁelds addressing imperfect competition, while the logit is its natural counterpart.
Indeed, they both obey the same rules, apart from the fact that the former deals with
divisible consumption choices and the latter with indivisible job choices (Anderson et al.,
1992). Second, our main results are suﬃciently intuitive to conjecture that they hold true in
more general frameworks. Third, our model is amenable to the data because both the CES
and the logit can be tested by means of very eﬃcient econometric techniques. The ﬂexibility
of these two models should also permit to work with more general frameworks in empirical
2studies.
Last, as observed by Bhaskar et al. (2002) and Manning (2003), monopsony power on
the labor market does not imply the existence of a single employer. It means only that a
ﬁrm does not lose all its workers when slightly decreasing its wage. This observation has led
several authors to build on Salop (1979) to model heterogeneous ﬁrms competing to attract
heterogeneous workers. In such a setting, the nature of competition is oligopsonistic because
the competitive forces come from the two adjacent ﬁrms (Kim, 1989; Bhaskar and To, 1999,
2003; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Hamilton et al., 2000). The introduction of strategic
considerations in the labor market makes the analysis much more involved, thus leading
these authors to consider the product side as perfectly competitive. They fail to capture,
therefore, any type of interaction that could stem from imperfections on the product and
labor markets.
In contrast, by using monopolistic and monopsonistic competition, our setting encapsu-
lates general equilibrium interactions between the two markets. It also captures the main
aspect of imperfect competition, while avoiding the technical diﬃculties implied by strate-
gic interactions within each market. Moreover, our modeling approach leads to a tractable
framework, which translates into simple and neat results. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the ﬁrst one that addresses imperfect competition in the labor market by means of
monopsonistic competition in the tradition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).1
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the various assumptions made
to describe consumption and production. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium
when the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, while the subsequent section considers the case of




We consider an economy endowed with one sector and Θ types of labor. There are Lθ
workers of type θ and each worker is endowed with one unit of her type of labor. The
total population is denoted by L = ΣθLθ,w h i l eL ≡ (L1,...,LΘ). There are two goods. The
homogeneous good is unproduced (land) and its supply H is perfectly inelastic. It is used as
the numéraire. Each worker is endowed with H/L units of this good. The diﬀerentiated good
is produced under increasing returns and monopolistic competition; it is made available as a
continuum of varieties of mass N.F i r mi supplies variety i ∈ [0,N] and hires  θ (i) workers
of type θ =1 ,...Θ.T h i sﬁrm’s production function is given by a linear homogeneous function
F [l(i)],w h e r el(i) ≡ ( 1 (i),..., Θ (i)). Its output F [l(i)] is split between the quantity q(i)
oﬀered to consumers and the ﬁxed requirement f needed to undertake production. In other
words, we have:
q (i)=F [l(i)] − f. (1)
1To (2009) uses a CES function to describe the aggregate labor market, but he does not address the
individual job choices made by workers.
3When there is a single type of workers, the unit of labor is chosen for the production function
to be written as follows:
q(i)= (i) − f.
Note that our model need not be conﬁned to diﬀerent types of labor as inputs. It displays
enough versatility to deal with diﬀerent production factors such as capital and labor.
2.2 Workers
Preferences. Workers have a love for variety and share the same quasi-linear preferences
nesting a CES-subutility:
U(M,h)=αlnM + hα > 0 (2)










in which x(i) is the individual consumption of variety i of the diﬀerentiated good, while
σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Econometric estimations suggest that
σ varies from 5 to 10 (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Last, in (2), α>0 is a measure
of the desirability of the diﬀerentiated good relatively to the homogeneous good.
A θ-worker hired by ﬁrm i earns a nominal wage wθ (i) and has a budget constraint given
by

















is the price index of the diﬀerentiated good and π(i) the proﬁtm a d eb yﬁrm i (see below
for more details). Assuming that the initial endowment H is suﬃciently large for the con-
sumption of the homogeneous good to be positive in equilibrium, it is readily veriﬁed that
a worker’s expenditures on the diﬀerentiated good is such that PM = α. As expected, for a
given P, the consumption of this good increases with α. Furthermore, the individual inverse






Workers’ heterogeneity. Workers are free to choose the ﬁrm they want to work for.
As discussed in the introduction, they are heterogenous in their perception of the non-wage
attributes associated with a particular ﬁrm. Formally, the indirect utility of a θ-worker
employed in ﬁrm i is given by








π (i)di + wθ (i)+εθ (i)
4where the quality of her match with ﬁrm i is given by the realization of the random variable
εθ (i), which is known to the worker but unobservable by the ﬁrms. A worker chooses the




which depends on the wages set by ﬁrms and the levels of the worker’s match. We assume
that the random variables εθ (i) are independently and identically distributed according to
the Gumbel distribution with zero mean.2 This implies that the probability she chooses to










where νθ stands for the standard-deviation of εθ (i) (up to the numerical factor π/
√
6).
Such a modeling strategy allows one to account for a population of θ-workers exhibiting
heterogeneous tastes about ﬁrms/jobs since the probability that εθ (i)=εθ (j) is zero. In
(4), νθ is an index that captures the diversity of preferences across θ-workers who react
diﬀerently to the same wage schedule. Alternatively, νθ may be interpreted as an inverse
measure of θ-workers’ inter-ﬁrm mobility:a l a r g e r νθ implies that a smaller share of θ-
workers is willing to change jobs in response to a wage cut. Throughout the remaining
of the paper, we assume that νθ is small enough for the expressions derived below to be
positive.










When nominal wages are equalized across ﬁrms, this expression becomes wθ+νθ lnN,w h i c h
increases at a decreasing rate with the mass of ﬁrms. Workers’ heterogeneity thus translates
into a preference for job variety.
2.3 Firms
Since ﬁrms sell diﬀerentiated varieties, each ﬁrm can freely choose the price of its variety.
Since workers have heterogeneous preferences across employers, each ﬁrm is free to set its
wage for each type of labor. Speciﬁcally, when ﬁrm i sets the wage wθ (i),i ta t t r a c t s
 θ (i)=LθPθ (i)
workers of type θ. As a consequence, ﬁrms face monopolistic competition on the product
market and monopsonistic competition on the labor market.
2Because the support of the Gumbel distribution that generates the logit is the real line, a worker’s
highest hedonic wage could be negative. However, we may disregard this issue because each worker faces a
continuum of ﬁrms.




wθ (i) θ (i)
subject to (1) and (3).
Market clearing for variety i means that q(i)=Lx(i). Substituting (3) for p(i) and (1)
for x(i) yields the following expression for π (i):
π(i)=( αL)
1





wθ (i) θ (i) (5)
where  θ (i)=LθPθ (i). Hence, solving ﬁrm i’s proﬁt-maximization program amounts to
maximizing (5) with respect to wθ (i).
In order to disentangle the various eﬀects at work, it is both relevant and convenient to
distinguish between what we call a short-run equilibrium,i nw h i c ht h em a s sN of ﬁrms is
ﬁxed, and a long-run equilibrium i nt h ew h i c ht h em a s so fﬁrms is endogenously determined
through free entry and exit.
3 The short-run equilibrium
3.1 Wage and price







 θ (i). (6)





Hence, as long as θ-workers are heterogeneous (νθ > 0), ﬁrm i faces a supply curve with
a ﬁnite elasticity: ceteris paribus, the more heterogeneous the θ-workers, the smaller this
elasticity. In contrast, the supply curve is inﬁnitely elastic provided that θ-workers are
homogeneous, that is, they care only about their wage (νθ =0 ). Furthermore, this ﬁrm’s
labor supply becomes more (resp., less) elastic when the θ-workers earn a higher (resp.,
lower) wage, thus suggesting that high-productive workers are more responsive to wage
diﬀerences than low-productive workers.













θ − νθ (7)
where F0
θ denotes the derivative of F with respect to  θ (i). In this expression, the ﬁrst
term stands for the marginal revenue generated by a θ-worker. The second term captures
6the fact that workers’ heterogeneity endows ﬁrms with monopsony power. Since νθ > 0,
ﬁrms are able to pay the θ-workers a wage smaller than the marginal revenue they generate.
In other words, the degree of workers’ heterogeneity determines the degree of exploitation.
N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tθ-workers are paid the same wage although they face diﬀerent matching
values.
Given the symmetry of our setting, we ﬁnd it natural to focus on the symmetric outcome:
 θ (i)=Lθ/N x(i)=[ F (L) − Nf]/NL p(i)=p.
Substituting x(i) and P ≡ N
−1
σ−1p into (3) yields the equilibrium price:
p∗(N)=
αL
F (L) − Nf
(8)
This expression has several implications. First, when the labor force L remains constant,
the entry of new ﬁrms gives rise to two opposite eﬀects. A larger number of ﬁrms reduces
the output of each ﬁrm (F (L/N) − f), which fosters a higher price. In addition, a larger
number of ﬁrms also makes competition tougher, thus pushing the market price downward.
However, it is well known that the latter eﬀect vanishes under the CES. Consequently, the
former eﬀect is the only one at work. Indeed, inspecting (8) reveals that p∗ increases with
the mass N of ﬁrms.
Second, when the labor force increases homothetically, the equilibrium price goes down.
Indeed, although the total expenditure (αL) and the total production (F (L))i n c r e a s ea t
the same rate, the total production available for consumption (F (L) − Nf) increases at
an even higher rate, which yields a lower price. Last, observe that (8) is independent
from the elasticity of substitution across varieties. This is because the quasi-linearity of
preferences implies that the amount spent on the diﬀerentiated product is equal to αL,
while the denominator F (L) − Nf is constant when N is ﬁxed.






θ − vθ (9)






F (L) − Nf
F0
θ − vθ. (10)
3.2 Labor exploitation
As shown by (9), the equilibrium wage of θ-workers diﬀers from their marginal value product,
pF0
θ. The exploitation of workers has two sources here. First, ﬁrms use their monopoly power
on the product market to set a lower wage equal to the marginal value product times the
inverse of the relative markup: (σ − 1)/σ < 1.I f t h e M-good were homogeneous, this
markup would be equal to 1. An elasticity of substitution varying from 5 to 10 suggests a
ﬁrst exploitation rate of about 10 to 20 percent of the marginal value product. Second, since
θ-workers exhibit diversity in their preferences for employers, ﬁrms use their monopsony
7power on the labor market to reduce the wage by vθ, which is itself given by the share
1/eθ of the wage. As noticed by Boal and Ransom (1997), Pigou (1924) used the ratio
1/eθ = νθ/wθ to measure labor exploitation. According to recent estimations the ﬁrm’s
labor supply elasticity would range from 2 to 4 (Manning, 2003; Ashenfelter et al., 2010),
suggesting a second exploitation rate varying from 25 to 50 percent of the observed wage.
Consequently, we may conclude that there is “double exploitation” of labor, that is, an
income transfer away from workers stemming from the fact that both the product and labor
markets are imperfectly competitive.
In order to shed light on this double exploitation, assume that there is a single type
of labor (Θ =1 )w i t hF (L)=L and constant returns (f =0 ). We ﬁrst determine the





Since individual expenditures on the diﬀerentiated product is α, the total revenue in the
M-sector is equal to αL. To begin with, assume that ﬁrms price at marginal cost. Under
constant returns, equilibrium proﬁts are zero. Therefore, the socially optimal wage is given
by w = α.A s s u m e n o w t h a t ﬁrms are free to choose their price on a monopolistically
competitive market. In order to hire workers, they enter into a bidding process in which
they increase their oﬀer up to the point where their bid equals their marginal revenue. Since
this one is smaller than the market price, the resulting equilibrium wage must be smaller
than α. This is precisely what (11) states: when monopolistic competition prevails on the
product market, the equilibrium wage is equal to the socially optimal wage times the inverse
relative markup. In other words, the equilibrium wage decreases with the degree of ﬁrms’
monopoly power on the product market. Even in the absence of imperfections on the labor
market, imperfect competition on the product market translates into a wage smaller than
the socially optimal wage because ﬁrms strives to produce less and, consequently, to hire
less workers.
Consider now the reverse thought experiment in which ﬁrms selling a homogeneous good
operate under perfect competition, while workers are heterogeneous. In this case, since
p∗ = α, (10) becomes
w∗ = α − v.
Firms now build their monopsony power on the diversity of workers’ preferences. This allows
them to extract from their workers a premium v, which yields again an equilibrium wage
smaller than the socially optimal wage.
It remains to understand the role of increasing returns in the determination of the equi-








This expression shows that the presence of increasing returns implies that the relative de-
sirability of the diﬀerentiated product, measured by αL/(L − Nf),r i s e sw i t hf.T h i sn o w
leads ﬁrms to pay a higher wage to their workers because the total mass of workers net of
ﬁxed requirements, L − Nf, is lower than under constant returns.
8That said, it should be clear that (10) reﬂects the presence of those various eﬀects
encapsulated within a setting that involves several types of heterogeneous workers. To illus-
trate, consider now two diﬀerent types of labor (k and l) having the same diversity index















As expected, the workers with the higher marginal product earn more than those with the
lower marginal product. Indeed, wk >w l holds if and only if F0
k/F0
l > 1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the wage gap exceeds the productivity gap since the ratio wk/wl increases with ν as long
as F0
k/F0
l > 1.I n o t h e r w o r d s , heterogeneity makes the low-productivity workers relatively
worse oﬀ with respect to the high-productivity workers. This is because the relative value of
the match is lower for the high-wage workers than for the low-wage workers, thus making the
high-wage workers more sensitive to wage diﬀerences than the low-wage workers. MacDonald
and Reynolds (1994) found substantial evidence that the wedge between the wage and the
marginal value product is higher for a young baseball player than for an experienced player.
They also showed that salary diﬀerences between ﬁrst and second rank performers greatly
exaggerate talent diﬀerences.
It is worth stressing that the productivity level of workers reﬂects here their skill level
as well as their relative scarcity. A priori, we do not rule out the possibility that a large
number of high-skilled workers may have a lower marginal product than a small number of
low-skilled.


















W h a tm a t t e r si sn o ww o r k e r s ’m a r g i n a lp r o d u c tweighted by their diversity. For instance, if
the high-productivity workers value more the quality of the match than the low-productivity
ones (νk >ν l), they might be willing to take a job with a lower pay because they enjoy a
higher non-monetary compensation.
4 The long-run equilibrium
4.1 Wage dispersion




























is the average match. Inspecting (12) reveals that more market power on the product (σ
decreases) and labor (¯ ν increases) markets leads to a higher number of ﬁrms under free
entry.
Using N∗ allows one to show how entry aﬀects the structure of prices and wages. First,







This price encapsulates a “double premium” expressed through the relative markup and
the average match, which reinforce each other. Speciﬁcally, unlike what we observe under a
ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, the sources of imperfection in both markets impact on the long-run
equilibrium price through the entry or exit of ﬁrms.






θ − νθ. (13)
Unlike the short-run wage, the long-run wage is not aﬀected by ﬁrms’ monopoly power on
the product market. In contrast, monopsony power matters in a way that needs clariﬁcation.








(ii) When there is a single type of heterogeneous workers, we have F(L)=LF 0(L) and
¯ ν = νθ. In this case, (13) boils down to the socially optimal wage:
w∗ = α = wc.
Under free entry, ﬁrms use their monopoly power in the product market to generate markups
that are just suﬃcient to cover their ﬁxed costs. In contrast, ﬁrms are not able to exploit
workers’ heterogeneity because entry washes out their monopsony power in the labor market.
This shows how peculiar may be a modeling strategy relying on the single type of labor.
(iii) When there are several groups of heterogeneous workers who are equally productive
in the sense that LF0
θ = F (L),w eh a v e
w∗
θ = α +¯ ν − νθ.
Hence, there is wage dispersion even when workers have the same productivity.M o r e p r e -
cisely, the more (resp., less) heterogeneous workers earn a wage smaller (resp., higher) than
the average wage α. This is because workers who value speciﬁc ﬁrms are willing to work for
a lower pay, whereas employers have to pay higher wages to attract workers who are more
or less indiﬀerent across ﬁrms.
To sum up, under free entry and exit, both workers’ heterogeneity and several types of
labor are needed for wage dispersion to arise around the competitive wage.
104.2 The distribution of earnings











Therefore, the θ-workers earn a wage higher than the competitive wage once the ratio of their
marginal product to the average production of labor exceeds the ratio of their diversity index
to the average index. In particular, one may expect productive workers with a low diversity
index to beneﬁt from the presence of workers with high diversity indices to extract more than
the competitive wage. This has a worth-stressing implication in the special, but relevant,
case of two production factors, labor and capital. Indeed, capital-owners are better-oﬀ when
workers are heterogeneous, whereas workers are hurt by the fact that typical capital-owners
seek the highest rate of return. This holds true as long as capital-owners display a diversity
index smaller than workers’. Conversely, when capital is locked in speciﬁc locations such as
the heavy industry, mobile workers exhibit a lower degree of diversity that allow them to
secure earnings exceeding their competitive wages. In a nutshell, by extracting more than
its competitive earning, the production factor with the higher mobility across ﬁrms gains at
the expense of the production factor with the lower mobility.
More generally, an increase in νθ gives rise to two contrasting eﬀects. First, it increases
ﬁrms’ monopsony power over the θ-workers, which allow ﬁrms to pay them a lower wage.
Second, ﬁrms make higher proﬁts, thus triggering the entry of new ﬁrms. This shifts upward
the demand for labor, thus raising workers’ earnings. As shown by diﬀerentiating (13)
with respect to νθ, the increase in νθ is always detrimental to the θ-workers who get more
exploited by their employers. In contrast, this increase is always beneﬁcial to all the other
groups of workers because it promotes entry only. For example, in a society where women
would value more than men hedonic attributes, such as time ﬂexibility and home proximity,
women having the same productivity as men would earn lower wages. In addition, observing
a negative correlation between seniority and salary of university professors, Ransom (1993)
argues that “[i]ndividuals with high moving costs receive lower salary oﬀers and have higher
seniority than individuals with low moving costs.” This explanation concurs with our results.
If the θ-workers have a diversity index identical to the average index (νθ =¯ ν), these
workers beneﬁt from monopsonistic competition if they belong to a high productivity group
(F0
θ >F(L)/L)a n ds u ﬀer from it otherwise. To illustrate, assume that all types of workers

















In words, if the productivity of a group of workers diﬀers from the average productivity more
(resp., less) than their diversity index diﬀers from the average index, then they earn more
(resp., less) than the wage they would get on a competitive labor market. In the limit, if all
workers have the same diversity index, the wage of the more (resp., less) productive workers
is higher (resp., lower) than their respective competitive wage. This is so because the relative
value of the hedonic attributes is higher for low productive workers than for high productive
workers. The presence of workers with a relatively low inter-ﬁrm mobility allows ﬁrms to
11pay them lower wages, thus inviting entry. As a consequence, there is more competition on
the labor markets, especially for the workers who value relatively less the hedonic attributes
of jobs, i.e. those with a high productivity. Accordingly, the high-productive workers are
overpaid, whereas the low-productive workers are underpaid, thus implying an implicit in-
come transfer from the latter to the former since ﬁrms’ proﬁts are zero.T h i sc o n c u r sw i t h
MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) who found senior pitchers to be overpaid relative to their
marginal product.
Furthermore, (15) reveals that, everything else being equal, the discrepancy between the
equilibrium and the competitive wage (w∗
θ −wc
θ) rises as the level of θ-workers’ productivity
increases. Therefore, the heterogeneity of workers’ preferences magniﬁes the advantage
of being more productive and the disadvantage of being less productive. This pecuniary
externality triggers a rat race in that it provides all workers with incentives to acquire a
level of human capital exceeding the level that would be socially optimal with homogeneous
workers. The above results have another noticeable implication. Since academics are likely
to display fairly heterogeneous preferences, universities will pay disproportionately high
salaries to the super-stars, while underpaying the others.
More generally, if, for whatever reason, the marginal product of a group k evaluated
at F(L) rises while the marginal product of the other groups remains the same, the total
production increases. Inspecting (13) shows that the wage of the k-workers rises, whereas
the wages of the other groups fall. In particular, consider two types of labor, the skilled
and the unskilled. If the skilled beneﬁt from a positive technological shock that make them
more productive, they earn a higher wage whereas the unskilled experience an absolute wage
decrease. Hence, our setting provides a rationale for the growing wage inequality between
high- and low-skilled workers observed during the last 30 years in many developed countries.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The fact that both sides of the product and labor markets are heterogeneous has several
important policy implications. First of all, an elasticity of a ﬁrm’s labor supply equal to 4
implies that on average workers accept a wage cut of 25% as a counterpart of the hedonic
job attributes, while an elasticity of substitution across varieties equal to 7 implies that
their marginal productivity is evaluated at 86% of the market price. Second, a group of
workers showing a high degree of attachment to speciﬁc job attributes are discriminated
against compared to a group of workers who put a low weight on non-wage characteristics.
For example, in a society dominated by male chauvinist behaviors, women will earn less
than men even when they both have the same productivity. Third, if capital exhibits more
inter-ﬁrm mobility than labor, capital-owners capture a rent at the expense of workers.
How big is this rent is an empirical question that cannot be addressed here. Fourth, since
high-productive workers are overpaid, individuals invest too much in human capital, thus
leading to excessively high expenditures in education. Fifth, preference heterogeneity tends
to exacerbate wage inequalities among workers’ types. Last, institutions such as minimum
wage rules or unions that push wages up more for lesser than higher skilled men (Card et
al., 2004) reduce wage dispersion not only by raising the wage of the low-paid workers but
also by indirectly decreasing those of the high-paid workers. Tax progressivity should play a
12similar role by reducing more the elasticity of ﬁrms’ supply of high-paid workers than that
of the low-paid workers.
The CES model of monopolistic competition has been extensively used in many economic
ﬁelds (Matsuyama, 1995). The tractability of our model, which nests monopsonistic com-
petition into a standard model of monopolistic competition, should permit its application
to a wide range of issues. In particular, given the extensive use of the CES in international
trade, it seems natural to investigate how trade barriers and monopsony power interact to
determine the level of trade ﬂows. Moreover, an exporting ﬁrm must hire a larger num-
ber of workers to supply its bigger outlet. To do this, it must set higher wages than the
non-exporting ﬁrms. In other words, exporting generates additional costs. To obviate the
increase in the cost of labor, enterprises facing a growing demand may choose to set up pro-
duction facilities in several regions or countries, even in the absence of trade costs. Another
line of research that seems worth pursuing is to study how the size and structure of the
labor force aﬀect the price and wage levels and to compare the corresponding results with
those obtained in more standard approaches.
L a s t ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tﬁrms are homogeneous. However, evidence is mounting that
they are heterogeneous. In this case, it is natural to expect the more productive ﬁrms to have
higher sales, which requires a larger labor force. Being more productive, these ﬁrms can aﬀord
to pay higher wages to attract the additional workers they need. Since the high-productive
workers value relatively more their monetary wages than the other jobs’ attributes, the
more productive ﬁrms will enjoy a more productive labor force, thus magnifying their initial
technological advantage through a composition eﬀect.
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